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Report on North Vietnamese Violations Between March 6 and April 12, 1973

A. Continued infiltration of North Vietnamese troops in violation of the Agreement:

1. Since the cease-fire of January 27, we have conclusive evidence that 15,000 North Vietnamese troops and nearly 4,000 other personnel in special purpose groups started their infiltration towards South Vietnam. In addition, approximately 20,000 troops already in the infiltration corridors on January 27 continued their journey south and have now arrived at their destinations.

2. The following illegal redeployments of North Vietnamese military units have also been noted:

(a) In April, 2 NVA anti-aircraft regiments were observed moving from Quang Tri Province into Laos.

(b) Also in April, the headquarters element of an NVA armored regiment, previously located near Hanoi, appeared at a point on the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border, north of Loc Ninh in GVN MR-3.

(c) The North Vietnamese SAM-2 missile regiment which entered South Vietnam in February has now constructed a total of 10 firing positions in the vicinity of Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province.

(d) At least one new North Vietnamese anti-aircraft regiment has infiltrated into South Vietnam since March 6. In mid-March, the headquarters and two battalions of a new AAA regiment were detected in Kontum Province in GVN MR-2. At least 15 such regiments are now believed to be located in South Vietnam.

B. Continued illegal movement of supplies and equipment by North Vietnam:

3. In the period March 6 to April 12, the North Vietnamese have continued to move very large quantities of military equipment and supplies out of North Vietnam and into Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. The rate at which these supplies are being moved continues to be at least equal to that of the pre-cease-fire period. We have been particularly disturbed by the illegal movement into South Vietnam of some 400 armored vehicles, at least 200 pieces of heavy artillery, including 3 groups of 130 mm field guns, and the emplacement of a SAM-2 missile regiment at Khe Sanh in Quang Thi Province. These deliveries have increased weapons inventory above the level of April 1972 and by their distributive pattern have substantially augmented NVA capabilities in areas where such heavy weapons in large number were not previously located.

4. Attached at Annex 1 is a detailed enumeration of confirmed instances of illegal North Vietnamese logistics actively observed in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam. We are convinced that these movements reflect deliveries intended to support military operations in

South Vietnam.

C. Continued hostile action by North Vietnamese forces.

5. In addition to the very heavy violations of Article 7 which these movements of supplies and personnel reflect, there have been frequent and flagrant violations of Article 3 (c) of the Agreement which requires a total halt to offensive military operations. PRG and North Vietnamese forces have committed particularly massive violations at the ARVN bases at Tong Le Cham and Rach Bap in MR-3 and at Tri Ton and Hang Ngu district capitals in MR-4.

6. In violation of Article 10 of the ICCS protocol, hostile actions by North Vietnamese forces have also seriously hindered the operations of the International Commission for Control and Supervision and have frequently placed in danger the lives of the Commission's delegates. The most egregious example of such actions occurred on April 5 when an ICCS helicopter was destroyed and 9 passengers were killed by North Vietnamese forces in Quang Tri Province. Numerous other instances of firing upon ICCS helicopters also have been reported. The safety of ICCS personnel has also been seriously threatened by numerous artillery and rocket attacks upon Tin Ton and Hong Ngu district towns where Commission members have been stationed.

1. The following instances of North Vietnamese logistics activity were observed on roads within South Vietnam in the areas of the Lao and Cambodian borders and the DMZ from March 6 to April 12. These movements probably reflect supplies which recently entered South Vietnam.

(a) On March 6, nine North Vietnamese trucks were observed towing anti-aircraft guns and two 130mm field guns southward on Route 13 toward Loc Ninh in northern Binh Long Province some 6-8 miles below the Cambodian border.

(b) Evidence indicates that one NVA logistic unit in northeastern Quang Tri Province accepted or dispatched about 2,500 vehicles in the March 8-14 period. The vehicles were operating in the area of the Cua Viet and Ben Hai rivers.

(c) On March 11, a convoy of 47 trucks was observed moving east and south of Khe Sanh.

(d) There were 106 southbound trucks observed on Route 1033 in the DMZ during the period March 8 through 14.

(e) Eleven trucks were observed moving east on Route 9 in western Quang Tri Province during the period March 8 through 14.

(f) On March 17, good evidence indicates that 55 North Vietnamese cargo trucks delivered over 100 tons of cargo to several locations in northern GVN MR-1.

(g) On March 19, 50 trucks were observed halted on Route 922, north of the A Shau Valley within South Vietnam.

(h) On March 19, an NVA logistics unit in the A Shau Valley in South Vietnam was observed receiving over 170 tons of cargo, primarily ammunition.

(i) On March 19, a total of 7 new NVA storage areas were observed in the A Chau Valley. These facilities, all constructed since February 24, contain as many as seven storage buildings each plus additional areas for open storage.

(j) On March 19, at least 130 tons of ammunition were observed moving between NVA logistic units operating in Quang Tri Province.

(k) In western Quang Tri Province, 35 trucks were observed traveling south and 35 north on March 20 through the operational area of one NVA logistic unit.

(l) On March 20, 46 trucks were observed moving ammunition in one area of Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam.

(m) On Route 1033 in the western DMZ, there were 72 cargo trucks observed moving south during the period 16 through 22 March.

(n) Reports from Quang Tri Province indicate that on March 20 one NVA logistic unit received or dispatched 200 vehicles, while another unit received or dispatched 300 vehicles on the same date.

(o) On March 21 and 22, 1,100 tons of rice and unspecified ordnance were shipped between two logistic units operating in Quang Tri Province.

(p) On March 23 and 25, an NVA logistic unit in Quang Tri Province received over 400 tons of assorted types of munitions. On March 25, the same unit had, in addition, nearly 400 tons of munitions in storage.

(q) From March 23 through March 29, 89 cargo vehicles were observed moving south on Route 1033 in the western DMZ.

(r) On March 30, 26 vehicles reportedly delivered 93 tons of TNT, rocket and mortar ammunition to a logistic entity in northern Quang Tri Province. After the receipt of this cargo, the unit was observed to have over 900 tons of ammunition and construction-related explosive material in storage.

(s) On March 31, 137 cargo trucks were observed along Route 9 in western Quang Tri Province. Some were headed east; some were headed west.

(t) In the Khe Sanh area, 23 cargo vehicles were observed halted on Route 608 (north of Khe Sanh) and 30 cargo vehicles dispersed along Route 616 (to the south) on March 31.

(u) On April 3, 18 cargo trucks were observed moving west on Route 9 in the Khe Sanh area. There were also 65 North Vietnamese cargo vehicles -- 35 of them parked -- on Route 608 north of Khe Sanh on the same day.

(v) On April 3, 27 southbound cargo vehicles were observed on Route 1033 in the western DMZ, and a total of 98 cargo vehicles moved south over this route during the period March 30 through April 5. Also in this area, 14 northbound cargo trucks were seen on Route 1032B on April 3.

25X1 (w)  indicates that the North Vietnamese are making contingency plans to move some supplies across the border from Laos into Quang Tri Province camouflaged as civilian traffic, if and when planned ICCS checkpoints in that area become operational.

(x) Between April 6-10, NVA vehicle activity was observed each day on Route 9 in northern Quang Tri Province, as follows:

(1) On April 6, 29 cargo trucks were observed moving on the route between Dong Ha and the Laos/South Vietnam border (7 eastbound, 15 westbound, 7 parked).

(2) On April 7, 59 cargo vehicles were noted on Route 9 in the immediate vicinity of Khe Sanh (24 eastbound, 19 westbound, 16 parked).

(3) On April 8, 85 cargo trucks were moving on the segment between Dong Ha and Khe Sanh (19 eastbound, 31 westbound, 35 parked).

(4) On April 9, 98 cargo vehicles were noted between Dong Ha and the border (43 eastbound, 39 westbound, 16 parked).

(5) On April 10, 63 cargo trucks were observed on the segment west of Dong Ha (20 westbound, 14 eastbound, 29 parked).

(y) On April 6, in the A Shau Valley region, 15 cargo trucks were observed on Route 548 southeast of Khe Sanh (9 southbound, 6 parked). There were also 11 trucks noted on this route on April 8 (7 southbound, 4 northbound).

(z) On April 7, 21 cargo vehicles were observed on Route 6089 southeast of Khe Sanh (11 northbound, 6 southbound, 4 parked).

(aa) On April 8 and 9, 16 cargo vehicles were detected moving on Route 616 southeast of Khe Sanh. Two of the vehicles were southbound, 3 were northbound, and 11 were parked. Also on Route 616 in the same area, 11 cargo trucks and 31x57mm AAA pieces were observed on April 10 parked along the road.

(bb) On April 8, on Route 1 in northeastern Quang Tri Province, 16 cargo vehicles and 41 buses were observed parked along the road north of Quang Tri City. In the same area, 9 cargo trucks (4 northbound, 1 southbound, 4 parked) were observed on April 10, with 4 buses parked along the road.

(cc) On April 9, 16 cargo trucks, 5 tanks, 1 APC and 6 field artillery pieces were seen parked along Route 547 southwest of Hue.

(dd) On April 9, 21 cargo vehicles were seen on Route 922 traveling on the segment immediately inside the South Vietnam/Laos border. Sixteen of the vehicles were moving south, six of them towing light artillery pieces.

(ee) In the period April 6 through 12, 130 southbound cargo vehicles were observed on Route 1033 in the western DMZ.

(ff) On April 10, nine southbound cargo vehicles were observed on Route 1000 in the eastern DMZ.

2. There are continuing indications of North Vietnamese logistic activity in the Laos Panhandle and northeastern Cambodia. Historical precedent would suggest that much of this activity probably involves supplies destined for South Vietnam.

(a) On March 8, a convoy of 50 to 60 North Vietnamese cargo trucks was observed moving supplies south along Route 16 through Attapeu and into Cambodia. The convoy was carrying both foodstuffs and munitions.

(b) From February 23 to March 9, over 1,000 trucks were observed moving south through the Ban Karai Pass.

(c) Two NVA logistic units in the tri-border area of Laos were observed dispatching over 300 vehicles toward South Vietnam and Cambodia during the first 10 days of March.

(d) On March 16, a North Vietnamese logistic entity operating in northeastern Cambodia reportedly dispatched at least 88 vehicles carrying unspecified types of cargo.

(e) On March 16-17, an NVA logistic unit operating in the tri-border area was observed receiving 70 cargo vehicles and on March 17 dispatching 30 vehicles destined for South Vietnam. The unit reportedly had a large amount of cargo, including some fuel, which was to be sent to forward areas in southern South Vietnam.

(f) In eastern Laos, a convoy of 19 cargo trucks loaded with supplies was observed on March 18 on Route 922, 9 miles west of the Laos/South Vietnam border.

(g) 188 cargo trucks were observed moving southward on Route 912 through the Ban Karai Pass during the period March 16 through 22.

(h)  as

of March 20 the North Vietnamese were making a substantial effort to upgrade the route system in the northern Plaine des Jarres. Bridge and drainage

ditch construction and road grading were observed on Route 7, the primary route into the Plaine from North Vietnam, and also on Routes 4 and 4/7 which transit the northern Plaine in an east-west direction.

(i) On March 22, about 200 vehicles were observed moving between NVA logistic entities in the northwest Bolovens region and the area west of Chavane in the Laos Panhandle.

(j) On March 23, an NVA logistic unit in the tri-border area had 77 vehicles in operation. In addition, the unit received another 6 cargo vehicles, reportedly carrying carbine ammunition, on the same date.

(k) During the period March 23-29, 235 cargo vehicles were detected traveling south on Route 912 through the Ban Karai Pass. There were also 245 northbound vehicles observed moving through the Pass during this period.

(l) On March 24, an NVA logistic unit operating near Ban Bac in the Laos Panhandle was observed to have almost 70 cargo vehicles operating in its area, including 23 northbound, 31 southbound and 14 parked vehicles, all of which were on Route 99.

(m) On March 25, another NVA logistic unit south of Saravane - received 46 cargo vehicles and dispatched another 42.

(n) On March 26, 99 cargo vehicles were observed moving southward in the Ban Bac area.

(o) On March 28, 70 trucks were observed on Route 966 east of Chavane. This is more than three times the number seen along this route on any one day since the February 22 Laotian cease-fire.

(p) On March 29, a North Vietnamese logistic unit active in the Nam Ou River area of Luang Prabang Province received over 400 rounds of rocket and mortar ammunition, plus significant quantities of mines, grenades and other associated hardware.

(q) From March 29 through April 1, at least 370 vehicles were observed moving between two Communist logistic units in the southern Laos Panhandle. About 200 of these vehicles were headed for a destination in northeastern Cambodia adjacent to Pleiku Province, South Vietnam.

(r) One NVA logistic unit active in the area northwest of Ban Bac moved 690 cargo-loaded vehicles into the A Shau Valley region during March, according to reliable evidence.

(s) On March 29, a North Vietnamese logistic unit operating in the Tchepone area received 42 cargo vehicles and dispatched 71.

(t) On March 31, ten NVA cargo trucks were observed halted on Route 23 south of Mu Gia Pass.

(u) On April 3, 26 southbound cargo trucks were observed on Route 912 southwest of the Ban Karai Pass. During the period March 30 through April 5, 258 northbound and 259 southbound trucks were observed transiting the Pass.

(v) On April 5, heavy truck movement was observed on routes 99 and 920 in the central Laos Panhandle. In all, over 200 NVA trucks were seen, of which more than half were loaded and heading south.

(w) The following activity was observed on Route 99 in the central portion of the Laos Panhandle from April 6 - 10:

(1) On April 6, 50 cargo trucks were observed parked between Muong Nong and the intersection of Route 96.

(2) On April 7, 186 cargo vehicles were detected on the segment between Muong Nong and the Route 96 intersection (33 northbound, 50 southbound, 103 parked).

(3) On April 8, 24 cargo trucks were traveling the route in the vicinity of Muong Nong (12 northbound, 6 southbound, 6 parked).

(4) On April 9, 48 cargo trucks were on the highway between Muong Nong and the Route 96 intersection (25 northbound, 15 southbound, 8 parked).

(5) On April 10, 21 cargo trucks (9 south, 2 north, 10 parked) and 1 bulldozer were observed moving north on Route 99 just south of Muong Nong. In addition, one APC was observed parked along the road in the same area.

(x) On April 6, 20 NVA cargo trucks were observed on Route 9222A near the Laos/South Vietnam border. Six of the vehicles were traveling south and were towing three 37mm AAA weapons.

(y) On April 6, 28 cargo trucks were observed on Route 966 east of Chavane, near the South Vietnam border (9 westbound, 11 eastbound, 8 parked). On April 7, 43 cargo vehicles were observed in the same area (34 eastbound, 9 parked).

(z) On April 6, on Route 9 west of the Laos/South Vietnam border, 9 cargo trucks were seen parked. Ten westbound trucks and 1 eastbound were seen in the same area on April 7, and 5 eastbound and 1 parked on April 8.

(aa) On April 6, 18 cargo trucks were observed on Route 9211 southeast of Saravane, 11 moving south, 4 north, and 3 parked. On April 8, 25 more trucks were observed (17 moving south, 6 north, and 2 parked).

(bb) On April 8, a North Vietnamese logistic unit in northeastern Cambodia reportedly transported 77 tons of petroleum and diesel fuel, 88 tons of rice, and over 50 tons of food supplies to an NVA Engineer Regiment operating in the area.

(cc) On April 8 and 9, southwest of the Ban Karai Pass, 27 cargo vehicles were detected on Route 912 (10 northbound, 17 parked). During the period April 6 through April 12, 322 vehicles were detected moving south and 323 traveling north through the Ban Karai Pass.

3. There is additional evidence of the continuing movement within North Vietnam of military and other supplies which are probably moving to northern and southern Laos and South Vietnam.

(a) Reliable information indicates that an NVA logistic unit operating south of Vinh in North Vietnam planned to ship over 1,000 tons of cargo south during the month of March.

(b) Another NVA logistic unit operating in the Vinh area was observed on March 9 sending as many as 85 vehicles to pick up cargo at a railroad depot for movement to north Laos.

(c) On March 15, a logistic unit operating in the Vinh area of North Vietnam was observed transporting over 100 tons of foodstuffs and other supplies to northern Laos via Route 7.

(d) In the Vinh area, 35 vehicles were observed picking up cargo at the Cho Si Railroad Station on March 15 and transporting it toward Muong Sen, on Route 7 at the border with north Laos.

(e) On March 16, nearly 200 tons of cargo were observed being offloaded from barges by an NVA logistic unit south of Vinh.

(f) On March 23 and 24, 127 tons of foodstuffs, 25 tons of gasoline, and 16 tons of ammunition were shipped from a storage area near Vinh to northern Laos via Route 7.

(g) On March 24, another 88 tons of cargo were dispatched from the Vinh area to an NVA logistic unit on the border of northern Laos. The cargo included 17 tons of ammunition and 25 tons of foodstuffs, the remainder being unspecified cargo.

(h) On March 27, 116 trucks were observed operating along Route 7 near the Plaine des Jarres. This is more than double the number observed on any one day since the Laotian cease-fire of February 22.

(i) On March 30, a storage facility near Vinh was observed dispatching toward northern Laos 11 tons of cargo, including 8 tons of explosives.

(j) On March 31, 53 tons of supplies -- including six tons of ammunition -- were shipped from Vinh over Route 7 toward northern Laos.

(k) The major NVA POL transshipment facility located in Thanh Hoa Province pumped nearly 7,000 tons of POL during March, according to reliable information. Past experience would indicate that nearly all of this amount was being moved southward.

(1) On April 6 and 7, nearly 200 cargo vehicles passed through the operational area of an NVA logistic unit south of Dong Hoi. The total included at least 85 southbound vehicles. The same unit reportedly had 146 vehicles (74 northbound, 72 southbound) pass through its area on April 10.

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SIHANOUK SAYS 'CAMBODIA WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE'

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(TEXT) PEKING, APRIL 13, 1973 (HSINHUA)--CAMBODIAN HEAD OF STATE SAMDECH NORODOM SIHANOUK STRESSED AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE HERE THIS EVENING: "CAMBODIA WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE, NOR COMPROMISE. IF THE USA DOES NOT STOP ITS INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA WE WILL GO ON FIGHTING."

THE SAMDECH SAID, TWO MONTHS AGO HE PROPOSED OFFICIALLY ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT AND THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION OF CAMBODIA THAT HE MIGHT HAVE, WITHOUT ANY PRE-CONDITIONS, SOME CONTACT WITH THE U.S. SIDE, TO STUDY TOGETHER A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA. HE SAID, "WE SHOULD BE READY TO FORGET ALL THE BOMBING AND SUFFERINGS IMPOSED ON OUR PEOPLE BY THE USA. WE PROPOSED TO HAVE A RECONCILIATION WITH THE USA," "BUT WE MAINTAIN THAT THE USA MUST PUT AN END TO ITS MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN CAMBODIA, BUT AN END TO AIDING LON NOL, AND CEASE ITS INTERFERENCE IN OUR AFFAIRS."

HOWEVER THE U.S. SIDE WAS NOT READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH US, SAMDECH SIHANOUK POINTED OUT, SO WE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO CONTINUE OUR ARMED RESISTANCE.

THE SAMDECH WENT ON TO SAY: "WHEN WE SPEAK OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE USA, WE MEAN TO NEGOTIATE THE QUESTION OF ENDING U.S. INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA, NOT THE QUESTION OF CEASE-FIRE. THEY ARE TWO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS. FOR, IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, CEASE-FIRE MEANS SPLITTING OUR COUNTRY, MEANS RECOGNITION OF THE LON NOL-CONTROLLED ZONE. AND THIS IS DANGEROUS. INSTEAD OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA, IT WILL PROLONG THE WAR. IF THE USA CEASES ITS INTERFERENCE IN CAMBODIA, THE TRAITOROUS LON NOL REGIME WILL QUICKLY COLLAPSE. THEN, THE PROBLEM OF CAMBODIA WILL BE EASILY SOLVED."

SAMDECH SIHANOUK STRESSED: "WE NOW CONTROL NINE-TENTHS OF THE TERRITORY OF OUR COUNTRY. OUR PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION ARE STRONGER THAN EVER. THE BOMBING BY U.S. PLANES CANNOT MAKE US RETREAT. INSTEAD IT WILL URGE US TO PRESS FORWARD. THE USA CANNOT DEFEAT US. WE WILL NEVER ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE, NOR COMPROMISE. WE DO NOT LIKE WAR. WE LOVE PEACE, BUT WE HAVE NO CHOICE."

14 APR 0118Z EH/HH\*\*\*\*\*

U.S. military equipment assistance to Taiwan has changed significantly in character. There will be no grant material assistance provided after the current fiscal year which ends June 30, 1973. A small grant amount of less than \$6 million will be provided in each of the next two years, but this will only cover the cost of training in the United States for a few military personnel from Taiwan and the shipping costs for the small amount of equipment authorized in earlier years but not yet delivered.

The United States plans in the future to sell to Taiwan, either on a cash or credit basis, some defensive equipment and replacements and repair parts for equipment which was provided earlier. These sales will include equipment, materials and major assemblies which will permit the final assembly in Taiwan of 115 F-5 aircraft (interceptors with relatively short combat radius) over the four-year period from June 30, 1973 to June 30, 1977 and 226 helicopters over the five-year period from June 30, 1973 to June 30, 1978. The F-5 aircraft which Taiwan will acquire in this way will replace older aircraft now in use in the Taiwan air forces. There will be no increase in the total number of combat aircraft in the Taiwan inventory. It is expected, also, that these sales will include replacement trucks, small tactical radios and engineer equipment for construction and road maintenance, about 13 small coastal patrol boats, and two battalions of HAWK air defense weapons. The total value of these sales programs, including the aircraft, are expected to be about \$150 million per year, beginning July 1, 1973.

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATIONSECRET

April 7, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY

SUBJECT: Security Assistance, Taiwan

Our security assistance program for Taiwan has changed during the last few years as grant MAP decreased and FMS credits assumed more importance. At the end of FY 73, grants for MAP equipment will end, though we will continue to pay for training and supply operations costs on prior year MAP programs. In addition, in FY 73-74, there are sizable special grants resulting from our commitment to F-5E coassembly on Taiwan deriving from the GRC's help during Enhance Plus. The table below reflects the changing nature of these programs and itemizes the major military credit sales programs.

	Fiscal Years (\$ million)				
	72	73	74	75	76
Enhance Plus grant	--	18	28	--	--
MAP	11	10	5.8**	5.8**	.5
FMS Credit	45	44	65	135	124
--F-5E coassembly	--	( 5)	(23)	(69)	(61)
--Helo coproduction	( 9)	( 7)	( 7)	(11)*	(10)*
--Trucks	(12)	( 3)	( 6)*	( 5)*	( 5)*
--Patrol Boats	--	( 4)*	( 8)*	( 6)*	(12)*
--Hawk bns.	--	--	--	(17)*	(14)*
Total Grants and FMS	<u>56</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>141</u>	<u>125</u>

\* Not yet approved

\*\* 5.3 for supply operations, .5 for grant training.

You will note that though materiel grants are phasing out, total assistance has increased through FMS credits. This is consistent with Taiwan's continually improving economy, our commitment to the GRC, and the self-sufficiency aspects of the Nixon Doctrine.

SECRET (GDS)

FISCAL YEAR (\$ MILLION)

	<u>72</u>	<u>73</u>	<u>74</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>76</u>
Grant Materiel	3	1.5	0	0	0
Credit Sales	45	44	65	135	124
Cash Sales	<u>46</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>
TOTAL	94	94.5	65*	135*	124*

\* Cash sales unknown for FY 74-76

Authority E.O. 12958

By KJ NARA Date 07/08/97

\*\*\*\*\*TOP SECRET\*\*\*\*\*SCOPY

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To 4000

T O P S E C R E T / S E N S I T I V E E X C L U S I V E L Y E Y E S O N L Y S W H 0 0 3 1

APRIL 13, 1973

FROM: LORD

To: 4000

PLEASE GIVE THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO YOUR CUSTOMER.

BEGIN TEXT:

THE US SIDE HAS NOTED WITH EXTREME DISAPPOINTMENT THE RECENT REMARKS OF THE PRIME MINISTER WITH RESPECT TO THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA. THE CHINESE SIDE WILL RECALL THAT THE US SIDE, DURING DR. KISSINGER'S RECENT VISIT TO PEKING, OFFERED TO CONDUCT A CONFIDENTIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF CAMBODIA, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH ALL ELEMENTS IN THAT COUNTRY WOULD BE REPRESENTED. FURTHERMORE, THE US SIDE WISHES TO RECALL THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE VIETNAM AGREEMENT THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT, WITH US SUPPORT, UNILATERALLY CEASED ALL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AND OFFERED AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS. AT THAT TIME THE US SIDE CEASED ITS MILITARY AIR OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA. THE ONLY RESPONSE TO THESE OFFERS HAS BEEN A MARKED INCREASE IN MILITARY ATTACKS AND THE REFUSAL TO HOLD NEGOTIATIONS. THE CHINESE SIDE IS ALSO AWARE OF THE FACT THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE HAVE BLATANTLY AND OUTRAGEDLY VIOLATED THE VIETNAM AGREEMENT, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO ARTICLE 7 CONCERNING INFILTRATION, ARTICLE 15 CONCERNING RESPECT FOR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE, AND ARTICLE 20 CONCERNING LAOS AND CAMBODIA. THE CHINESE SIDE HAS RECEIVED DETAILED DOCUMENTATION ON THESE VIOLATIONS AND THE US SIDE IS PREPARED TO SUPPLY ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION THAT WOULD BE USEFUL.

IT CANNOT BE IN THE INTEREST OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR ONE-SIDED PUBLIC POSITIONS TO BE TAKEN, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE FACTS ON THE CURRENT SERIOUS DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA. THE US SIDE WISHES TO REITERATE ITS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS TO ADHERE TO THE VIETNAM AGREEMENT, END ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA, AND WORK FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN THAT COUNTRY THAT BRING ABOUT TRUE NEUTRALITY AND INDEPENDENCE. THE US SIDE BELIEVES,

\*\*\*\*\*  
 TRANSFER COMMENT: EXEMPT FROM OR. DEAL DECISION  
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
 INFO COPIES TO: LORD, HOWE  
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY: 1

INFO COPIES TO: LORD, HOWE

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2014/01/02 : LOC-HAK-462-2-9-7

Authority E.O. 12958

By KJ NARA Date 07/08/97

\*\*\*\*\* T O P S E C R E T \*\*\*\*\*S COPY

HOWEVER, THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL INTERESTED COUN-  
TRIES TO WORK FOR MODERATION ON THESE MATTERS. ONLY IN THIS  
WAY CAN AN EQUITABLE AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION BE FOUND.  
THE US SIDE WISHES TO UNDERLINE THE EXTREMELY GRAVE SITUATION  
THAT WILL ARISE IF NORTH VIETNAMESE VIOLATIONS AND MILITARY ESCALA-  
TION IN THE REGION CONTINUE.  
END TEXT

CONFIDENTIAL

Briefing item--HAK only

Peking Indicates Continued Strong Support for Sihanouk

The Chinese leadership has indicated its continuing strong support for Prince Sihanouk and his role in resolving the current Cambodian situation. Sihanouk was given a "grand welcome" in Peking upon his arrival from Hanoi on April 11. A state banquet was given the next day, and Premier Chou En-lai gave a speech which emphasized that the Prince's visit to the "liberated areas" in Cambodia "has once again eloquently proved that [he] is the head of state, beloved and supported by the Cambodian people. Chou "strongly condemned" the U.S. for continuing its "wanton bombings" in Cambodia and its support for the "traitorous Lon Nol clique." Our position was said by Chou to "seriously contravene the stipulations of the Paris agreement" on Vietnam. An authoritative editorial in the People's Daily gave added voice to Chou's remarks, emphasizing that the Prince's visit to the "liberated areas" showed that he was the legitimate ruler of Cambodia, and contrasting the improving situation for the people's war against "U.S. aggression" with the "death-bed struggle of the Lon Nol clique."

(Solomon)